Brooklyn Law Review
Volume 74 | Issue 4

Article 7

2009

Who Is to Blame? (and What Is to Be Done?):
Liability of Secondary Actors Under Federal
Securities Laws and the Alien Tort Claims Act
Andrei Takhteyev

Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr
Recommended Citation
Andrei Takhteyev, Who Is to Blame? (and What Is to Be Done?): Liability of Secondary Actors Under Federal Securities Laws and the Alien
Tort Claims Act, 74 Brook. L. Rev. (2009).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr/vol74/iss4/7

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Law Review
by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.

Who Is to Blame?
(and What Is to Be Done?)
LIABILITY OF SECONDARY ACTORS UNDER FEDERAL
SECURITIES LAWS AND THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT
I.

INTRODUCTION

Large-scale wrongs that inflict injuries on millions are rarely the
doings of a single person or entity but instead often involve the
participation of multiple secondary actors.1 A cable-box supplier enters
into a series of forged deals with a telecommunications company
allowing the company to overstate its revenue and thus mislead the
investing public about its financial health.2 An American automaker sells
custom-made military trucks to the government of apartheid-era South
Africa, which the government uses to terrorize the country’s black
majority.3 In both of these cases the underlying wrong—securities fraud
and genocide—would be actionable under a federal statute. Section 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Section 10(b)”) prohibits
corporations from making fraudulent statements to the investing public,4
while the Alien Tort Claims Act (“ATCA”) allows U.S. federal courts to
hear civil suits brought by victims of human rights abuses and other
international crimes.5 But whereas these federal statutes successfully
target the underlying illegal conduct itself, they fail to specify which
actors can be held accountable for the particular offense. Instead, the task
1

Secondary actors are parties that did not themselves commit the underlying wrong but,
through their conduct, contributed to and ultimately made possible the commission of the wrong.
See, e.g., Mark Harden, U.S. High Court Moves “Secondary Actors” Off Main Stage, DENVER BUS.
J., Jan. 25, 2008, available at http://www.bizjournals.com/denver/stories/2008/01/28/story14.html
(describing secondary actors in the securities litigation context as “third parties, such as accountants,
banks, law firms and suppliers, with business ties to accused companies . . . [who] secretly help[] the
companies defraud their investors”); cf. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 459
(3d ed. 2001) (“The ‘primary party’ is the person who personally commits the . . . offense. . . . Any
person who is not the primary party, but who is associated with him in commission of an offense is a
‘secondary party.’”); Lynda J. Oswald, International Issues in Secondary Liability for Intellectual
Property Rights Infringement, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 247, 247 (2008) (“Secondary liability is liability that
is imposed upon a defendant who did not directly commit the wrongdoing at issue, but whom the
law nonetheless holds responsible for the injuries caused.”).
2
See generally Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761
(2008).
3
See generally Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007).
4
15 U.S.C. § 78j (2006).
5
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).

1539

1540

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:4

of defining the scope of liability with regard to secondary actors is left to
the courts.6
In the securities fraud context, the Supreme Court has taken a
restrictive position, ruling in its 1994 decision in Central Bank of
Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A.7 that Section 10(b)
did not permit a private cause of action for aiding and abetting—a type
of secondary actor liability.8 That decision, however, did not entirely
foreclose liability of secondary actors under Section 10(b) because
plaintiffs developed legal theories that allowed them to stretch the limits
of primary liability to reach certain non-primary actors.9 More recently,
the Supreme Court further narrowed Section 10(b) liability for secondary
actors holding in Stoneridge Investment Partners LLC v. ScientificAtlanta, Inc.10 that a secondary actor was only liable for securities fraud
if plaintiffs could show that their damages were a direct result of the
secondary actor’s conduct itself, rather than the overall fraudulent
scheme.11
In contrast, the Supreme Court did not speak on the scope of
liability under ATCA until 2004, and even then the Court did not directly
address the issue of secondary actor liability.12 Most lower courts that
have faced the issue have assumed that ATCA allows aiding-andabetting liability.13 Thus, in 2007, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in
Khulumani v. Barclay National Bank Ltd.14 reversed the dismissal of
ATCA claims brought by victims of the South African apartheid regime
against a number of U.S. and foreign corporations, alleging that the
corporations aided and abetted the regime’s numerous atrocities by
supplying industrial, technological, and financial resources to the South
African government.15 But the Appeal Court’s split opinion and extensive
dicta highlighted the numerous problems with allowing aiding-andabetting liability under ATCA, such as the absence of a clear standard for
aiding and abetting in the context of international law violations, as well
as public policy concerns over holding corporations accountable merely
for doing business with oppressive regimes.16 Therefore, in the long run,
the future of secondary actor liability under ATCA remains uncertain.
Central Bank and Stoneridge on the one hand and Khulumani on
the other, although addressing two very different areas of law, share a
6

See infra Part V (discussing the role of federal courts in interpreting the scope of
Section 10(b) and ATCA).
7
511 U.S. 164 (1994).
8
Id. at 191.
9
See infra text accompanying notes 90-98.
10
128 S. Ct. 761 (2008).
11
Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 770 (2008).
12
See generally Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 714 (2004).
13
See infra note 128 and accompanying text.
14
504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007) (per curiam).
15
Id. at 260.
16
See infra Part IV.
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common set of questions: When is one entity responsible for the harm
caused by another? Does the same law that proscribes a particular type of
wrongdoing govern the conduct of all parties that contribute to the
wrongdoing? What is the difference between the liability of a primary
and a secondary actor? As a result, these cases provide a unique
opportunity to examine and compare the limits of liability of secondary
actors in the securities fraud and international human rights contexts.
By analyzing the more mature and developed jurisprudence on
secondary actor liability under Section 10(b), this Note attempts to derive
lessons for, and predict the future of, corporate accountability under
ATCA. Part II of the Note introduces the concept of aiding-and-abetting
in the general context of secondary actor liability. This Part shows that,
despite its deep historical roots, the doctrine of aiding-and-abetting
liability, especially in the civil context, lacks clarity and consistency,
which often puts it in the center of politically-charged debate about
corporate accountability. Part III examines the evolution of secondary
actor liability in Section 10(b) claims from Central Bank to Stoneridge
and discusses how the Supreme Court has, over time, limited plaintiffs’
ability to sue secondary actors for securities fraud.
Part IV analyzes aiding-and-abetting liability in the context of
ATCA claims, and, in particular, takes a close look at the Khulumani
decision, whose split opinion suggests a trend towards a more restrictive
construction of ATCA. Finally, Part V argues that while aiding-andabetting liability under ATCA was tentatively upheld in Khulumani, it
will likely be eliminated by the Supreme Court when the issue comes
before it. This Part demonstrates that the same reasoning that lead the
Supreme Court to strike down aiding-and-abetting liability under Section
10(b) in Central Bank will control the question of aiding-and-abetting
liability under ATCA. However, this restriction of ATCA’s scope will
not entirely foreclose claims against corporations that contribute to
human rights abuses and other international crimes, as, just like in
securities fraud suits, plaintiffs will be able to reinvent primary liability
to reach secondary actors, and will also develop alternative legal theories
for recovery and corporate accountability.
II.

AIDING AND ABETTING AS A SUBSET OF SECONDARY ACTOR
LIABILITY

The problem of secondary actor liability under the Securities
Exchange Act and ATCA, and the subset issue of liability for aiding and
abetting, stems to a large extent from the doctrinal confusion surrounding
these concepts and their relationship to primary liability. Aiding and
abetting is a typical way in which a secondary actor can contribute to the
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underlying offense.17 Whether aiding and abetting gives rise to primary
or secondary liability, however, remains doctrinally unsettled and
practically controversial.
Aiding and abetting is usually associated with accessorial
18
liability and often serves as a “shorthand term . . . [that] connotes some
lesser actor—not the individual who commits the offense—but the
individual who offers assistance to the primary actor.”19 In the securities
fraud context, for example, aiding and abetting is used as an antonym to
primary liability.20 But the long history of the term suggests a more
complicated and fluid relationship between aiding and abetting and
primary liability.
A.

Aiding-and-Abetting Liability in the Criminal Context

In his History of the English Laws, William Blackstone
distinguished between principal and accessory (or secondary) criminal
culpability.21 In turn, he divided principal culpability into first and second
degrees.22 According to Blackstone, “[a] principal in the first degree is he
that is the actor or absolute perpetrator of the crime; and in the second
degree he is who is present, aiding and abetting the fact to be done.”23
Thus, Blackstone categorized aiding and abetting as part of primary, not
secondary liability.
Similarly, a federal statute that codified criminal aiding-andabetting liability in 190924 makes anyone who “commits an offense
against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or
procures its commission . . . punishable as a principal.”25 Significantly,
the original language of the statute simply stated that one who aids or
17

Other ways in which a secondary actor may contribute to the offense include
participation in a criminal enterprise or conspiracy, instigation, and procurement. See Tarek F.
Maassarani, Four Counts of Corporate Complicity: Alternative Forms of Accomplice Liability Under
the Alien Tort Claims Act, 38 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 39, 39 (2005-06).
18
See DRESSLER, supra note 1, at 459 (“[A] person may be held accountable for the
conduct of another person if he assists the other in committing an offense. Liability of this nature is
called ‘accomplice’ or ‘accessory’ liability.”).
19
Adam Harris Kurland, To “Aid, Abet, Counsel, Command, Induce, or Procure the
Commission of an Offense”: A Critique of Federal Aiding and Abetting Principles, 57 S.C. L. REV.
85, 86 (2005).
20
Thus, under Central Bank, plaintiffs cannot sue aiders and abettors under Section 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act because the Act has been interpreted to impose only primary liability.
Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994); see
infra Part III.B.
21
WILLIAM C. SPRAGUE, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES ABRIDGED 437 (Callaghan &
Co. 9th ed. 1915) (1892).
22
Id. (“A man may be principal in an offence in two degrees.”).
23
Id. at 437-38 (emphasis added) (explaining that presence, for purposes of defining
principal culpability, may be actual physical or constructive).
24
Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 332, 35 Stat. 1088 (1909) (current version at 18 U.S.C.
§ 2(a) (2006)).
25
18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
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abets a federal crime “is a principal.”26 However, a 1951 amendment
changed the formulation to “is punishable as a principal” to “eliminate
all doubt that in the cases of offenses whose prohibition is directed at
members of specified classes . . . [an aider and abettor] who is not
himself a member of that class may nonetheless be punished as a
principal.”27
Thus, the doctrine of criminal aiding and abetting, from which
civil aiding and abetting originates,28 is not entirely clear on whether
aiders and abettors are liable as primary or secondary offenders. From a
theoretical point of view, this is due to the fact that aiding and abetting,
and secondary actor liability more generally, is premised on the common
law concept of concerted action.29 Under this concept, one who
participates in concerted conduct on behalf of another or a group is
jointly and severally liable for the actions of the entire group and of each
individual member.30 In a sense, then, a secondary actor whose conduct
falls under the legal standard for concerted action becomes the primary
actor.
In practice, this doctrinal confusion leads to a lack of consensus
among courts regarding the applicable standard that defines criminal
aiding and abetting.31 For example, courts disagree on the requisite mens
rea element for proving aiding and abetting.32 Some courts, guided by the
principle of equal moral blameworthiness underlying the doctrine,
consider aiding and abetting a specific intent offense and require that the
aider and abettor intend that the primary actor commit the underlying
crime.33 Yet other courts routinely apply the lower knowledge standard,
which only requires that the aider and abettor be aware of the underlying

26

§ 332, 35 Stat. at 1152 (emphasis added).
Kurland, supra note 19, at 90.
28
Christine L. Eid, Comment, Lawyer Liability for Aiding and Abetting Squeeze-Outs,
34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1177, 1180 (2008); see also Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First
Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 181 (1994).
29
Eid, supra note 28, at 1180.
30
Id. at 1180.
31
Baruch Weiss, What Were They Thinking?: The Mental States of the Aider and Abettor
and the Causer under Federal Law, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1341, 1344, 1351 (2002) (“[T]he current
status of the law on the aider and abettor’s mental state is . . . best described today as in a state of
chaos . . . .”); see also Kurland, supra note 19, at 85 (“Federal aiding and abetting law, which has
been spinning out of control for quite some time, has now spun totally out of control.”).
32
Judge Learned Hand famously formulated the mens rea standard by requiring that an
aider and abettor “in some sort associate himself with the venture, that he participate in it as in
something that he wishes to bring about, that he seek by his action to make it succeed.” United States
v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938).
33
See, e.g., United States v. Bancalari, 110 F.3d 1425, 1430 (9th Cir. 1997) (“To sustain
a conviction for aiding and abetting, the evidence must show that the defendant ‘specifically
intended to facilitate the commission of [the principal’s] crimes’ . . . .”) (alteration in original);
United States v. Scotti 47 F.3d 1237, 1240-41, 1244 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that a mortgage broker
who assisted in an extortionist loan scheme by arranging mortgage refinancing for the victim was
liable as an aider and abettor only if he acted with “the specific intent that his act . . . bring about the
underlying crime” (quoting United States v. Aiello, 864 F.2d 257, 262-63 (2d Cir. 1988))).
27
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offense.34 Likewise, there is no agreement among courts regarding how
to treat the actus reus element of criminal aiding and abetting, in
particular whether it is necessary to show that the secondary actor’s
conduct was the but-for cause of the harm.35 In practice, this uneven
application of the doctrine often leads to unfair results.36
B.

Aiding-and-Abetting Liability in the Civil Context

In the civil context, the doctrine of aiding-and-abetting liability
suffers from even more uncertainty than in the criminal field. There are
several reasons for this. First, in contrast to the criminal context,
Congress has not enacted a federal civil aiding-and-abetting statute.37 As
a result, federal courts are left entirely to their own devices in defining
the standard for civil aiding and abetting.38 Although the Restatement
(Second) of Torts made an attempt at bringing some uniformity to the
field,39 the Restatement’s definition of aiding and abetting has not
enjoyed wide acceptance among courts.40
Second, although civil aiding-and-abetting liability, in the form
of concerted action, has a long history,41 the doctrine is substantially less
developed than its criminal counterpart. Remaining relatively obscure for
34

See, e.g., United States v. Ortega, 44 F.3d 505, 508 (7th Cir. 1995) (“One who,
knowing the criminal nature of another’s act, deliberately renders what he knows to be active aid in
the carrying out of the act is . . . an aider and abettor even if there is no evidence that he wants the
act to succeed . . . .”) (emphasis added); see also Robert Weisberg, Reappraising Complicity, 4
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 217, 236 (2000) (“For decades, the American courts and legislatures have
debated whether knowledge or ‘true purpose’ should be the required mens rea for accomplice
liability.”).
35
Weisberg, supra note 34, at 228-30.
36
For example, requiring specific intent for aiding and abetting a “knowledge crime”
such as loan sharking, seems anomalous since “[f]or the very same crime, the principal can be guilty
when acting with knowledge or general intent, while the aider and abettor would not be guilty unless
acting with the more culpable mental state of purposeful intent.” Weiss, supra note 31, at 1378. On
the other hand, since aiders and abettors are “punishable as . . . principal[s],” 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2006), it
seems unfair to punish someone who merely knew about, but did not intend the commission of the
underlying offense. Id. at 1344 (providing examples of factual scenarios that lead to such a result);
see also Kurland, supra note 19, at 85.
37
Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164,
182 (1994).
38
Nathan Isaac Combs, Note, Civil Aiding and Abetting Liability, 58 VAND. L. REV. 241,
249 (2005) (“There is no clearly defined test for civil aiding and abetting liability because courts
apply different tests and often obfuscate their analyses.”).
39
Section 876 of the Restatement provides: “For harm resulting to a third person from
the tortious conduct of another, one is subject to liability if he (a) does a tortious act in concert with
the other or pursuant to a common design with him, or (b) knows that the other’s conduct constitutes
a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct
himself, or (c) gives substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing a tortious result and his own
conduct, separately considered, constitutes a breach of duty to the third person.” RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1979).
40
Combs, supra note 38, at 254-58.
41
Richard C. Mason, Civil Liability for Aiding and Abetting, 61 BUS. LAW. 1135, 1138
(2006) (writing that the concept of civil aiding-and-abetting liability in English law goes back at
least 400 years and has been cited in American cases since the mid-nineteenth century).
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decades,42 civil aiding and abetting first gained prominence in the context
of securities litigation.43 However, after the Supreme Court in Central
Bank expressly eliminated a private cause of action for aiding and
abetting federal securities fraud, the words “aid” and “abet” became
taboo among plaintiffs’ lawyers. Thus, after Central Bank, the plaintiffs’
bar was forced to resort to expressions, such as “a scheme to defraud,” to
describe conduct that would have previously been characterized as aiding
and abetting.44 Recently though, the doctrine of aiding and abetting has
been increasingly invoked in new contexts, such as professional
malpractice, human rights violations, and terrorism.45
Finally, civil aiding-and-abetting liability—a tort doctrine—
frequently attaches to criminal conduct, which gives rise to additional
problems. Although tort and penal law share a common origin and
perform overlapping functions,46 applying tort standards to criminal acts
can be problematic and lead to unfair outcomes. For example, a party
charged with civilly aiding and abetting a crime will be defending
against a less stringent tort standard and yet may face extremely large
monetary penalties and societal condemnation, which normally only
attaches to criminal convictions.47 As a result, the doctrine of civil aiding
and abetting remains on shaky conceptual grounds and uneven in
application.48
Because of its potential to serve as a wide net against an
unlimited number of third parties and its lack of clear standards,
enforcement of the doctrine of civil aiding and abetting is often
politically charged. Recently, in addition to securities litigation and
ATCA suits, the doctrine has been applied in contexts that involve such
diverse and controversial subjects as free speech, war on terror, and
liability of lawyers for aiding and abetting their clients’ breach of duty.
For instance, in Boim v. Quranic Literacy Institute,49 a circuit court
42

Combs, supra note 38, at 246; see also Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 489 (D.C.
Cir. 1983) (noting that the application of the doctrine was “largely confined to isolated acts of
adolescents in rural society”).
43
Combs, supra note 38, at 246 n.6, 263.
44
Stephen Taub, Aiding and Abetting Gets More Attention, COMPLIANCE WEEK, May
22, 2007, available at http://www.complianceweek.com/article/3359/aiding-and-abetting-gets-moreattention (describing plaintiffs’ attempts to look “for other ways around” aiding and abetting,
including sometimes relabeling the conduct as “scheme to defraud”); see infra notes 90-92 and
accompanying text.
45
Mason, supra note 41, at 1135.
46
Combs, supra note 38, at 250 (“Conceptually speaking, both criminal and tort law are
concerned with identifying and sanctioning wrongful conduct . . . .”).
47
See Mason, supra note 41, at 1146-63 (discussing the legal standards applied when
imposing civil aiding-and-abetting liability for criminal offenses).
48
Combs, supra note 38, at 248-49 (While “the theory of civil liability for aiding and
abetting is claiming a position of new importance in the law of torts . . . , [it] remains
underdeveloped.”).
49
291 F.3d 1000, 1021 (7th Cir. 2002), vacated and reh’g granted en banc, Boim v.
Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., 511 F.3d 707 (7th Cir. 2007); see also infra notes 229-234 and
accompanying text (discussing the rehearing decision).
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upheld a tort action filed by the parents of an American teenager killed
by the Palestinian militant group Hamas against several Muslim nonprofit organizations, alleging that the organizations aided and abetted an
act of terrorism by donating money to Hamas.50 In Rice v. Paladin
Enterprises, Inc.,51 another circuit court upheld an aiding-and-abetting
action brought by the family of a murder victim against the author of
“Hit Man,” an instructional manual for contract killers.52
These examples show that the doctrine of aiding-and-abetting
liability has evolved from its humble beginnings, as simply a type of
accomplice liability, into a separate and elaborate cause of action
implicating issues of social policy. Yet in spite of the attention it gets, the
doctrine lacks clarity and consistency. The next Part further illustrates
the doctrine’s ambiguity and controversial policy implications by
showing how the Supreme Court has restricted its application in the
context of Section 10(b) litigation, and how plaintiffs have responded by
reinventing secondary actor liability as a form of primary liability.
III.

SECONDARY ACTOR LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 10(B) OF THE
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT: FROM CENTRAL BANK TO
STONERIDGE

The last two decades have seen the doctrine of secondary actor
liability in the securities fraud context evolve from the relatively
permissive regime that allowed aiding-and-abetting liability for
secondary actors to a more restrictive one that required private Section
10(b) plaintiffs to plead all elements of a primary offense even against
secondary defendants. A brief overview of the Section 10(b)
jurisprudence helps better understand this evolution.
A.

Overview of Section 10(b) Claims

Congress passed the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 to address abuses in the securities markets,
exposed by the 1929 Wall Street stock crash and the ensuing Great

50

For an analysis of political issues affecting cases like Boim, see John D. Shipman,
Taking Terrorism to Court: A Legal Examination of the New Front in the War on Terrorism, 86
N.C. L. REV. 526, 529-30 (2008) (“Although lawsuits against private sponsors of international
terrorism appear to be a straightforward pursuit of justice, these cases have quickly evolved into a
Byzantine game of complicated legal and political maneuvering—not only among some of the
nation’s preeminent law firms, but also between Congress, the judiciary, and the executive branch.”)
(footnote omitted).
51
128 F.3d 233, 249-50 (4th Cir. 1997).
52
See Andrianna D. Kastanek, Comment, From Hit Man to a Military Takeover of New
York City: The Evolving Effects of Rice v. Paladin Enterprises on Internet Censorship, 99 NW. U.L.
REV. 383, 383 (2004) (analyzing the decision’s negative effects on freedom of speech on the
Internet).
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Depression.53 The 1933 Act regulates initial public offerings of securities
and the 1934 Act concerns secondary market trading.54 The Acts contain
several express rights of action.55 In addition, courts have found implied
rights of action in the terms of sections 10(b) and 14(a) of the 1934 Act.56
Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, [t]o use or employ, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . . , any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations
as the [SEC] may prescribe.57

The Act also authorizes the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) to adopt rules implementing the provisions of
Section 10(b).58 Under this mandate, the SEC promulgated Rule 10b-5,
which makes it unlawful for any person, “in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security” to:
(a) . . . employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b). . . make any
untrue statement [or omission] of a material fact . . . or (c). . . engage in any act,
practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or
deceit upon any person.59

Together, Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 have given rise to two
basic theories of liability for securities fraud. Under one theory, based on
the language in subsection (b) of Rule 10b-5 and often referred to as the
“misstatement” theory, shareholders can sue a person or entity that has
made a material misstatement (or, in some circumstances, an omission)
to the investing public. Typical defendants under this theory include
corporate officers and directors, who sign false or misleading financial
reports filed with the SEC or make untrue statements to the press, the
corporation itself, which is vicariously liable for the conduct of its
officers and directors, and the accounting firms that issue audit opinions
falsely certifying the accuracy of the company’s statements.60
Under the second theory, grounded in Rule 10b-5’s subsections
(a) and (c) and known as the “scheme to defraud” theory, a plaintiff can
53

Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164,
170-71 (1994).
54
See Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (2006)); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (1934)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78nn (2006)).
55
See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77k (imposing liability on filers of false registration statements).
56
Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 171.
57
15 U.S.C. § 78j.
58
Id.
59
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2008). Rule 10b-5, however, only reaches conduct already
proscribed by Section 10(b). Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct.
761, 768 (2008).
60
Andrew M. Edison, Stoneridge v. Scientific-Atlanta: “Scheme Liability” in the High
Court, LEGAL BACKGROUNDER (Wash. Legal Found., Wash., D.C.), Oct. 5, 2007, at 2, available at
http://www.wlf.org/upload/10-05-07edison.pdf (describing a typical Section 10(b) claim against a
primary actor).
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pursue a cause of action against a defendant who engages in any
deceptive conduct, including a manipulative act or a fraudulent scheme.61
This type of claim is frequently asserted against secondary actors, such
as the corporation’s business partners, underwriters, and outside auditors
who, although they do not make public statements to the market in
connection with the corporation’s securities, enter into fraudulent
arrangements with the corporation as part of the overall deceptive
scheme.62
In addition to proving the actus reus element of the fraud, which
can be either in the form of a misstatement or a deceptive act as part of a
scheme to defraud, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant acted with
scienter,63 and that the plaintiff’s loss had a proximate relation to the
substantive conduct or statement. This relation, in turn, must be proven
by showing that (1) the plaintiff relied on the fraudulent statement or
deceptive conduct in purchasing the corporation’s shares, and (2) the
statement or conduct directly caused the plaintiff’s economic loss.
In sum, whether the plaintiff is predicating her claim on the
“misstatement,” or on the “scheme to defraud” theory, the plaintiff must
prove (1) the actus reus, (2) scienter, (3) reliance, and (4) causation. A
plaintiff who adequately pleads all of the above elements64 will state a
claim for primary liability under Section 10(b), whether the defendant is
a primary or a secondary actor.65
B.

Central Bank and the Rejection of Aiding-and-Abetting Liability
Under Section 10(b)

Plaintiffs rarely invoked the “scheme to defraud” theory in their
suits until 1994.66 Prior to 1994, it was not necessary to plead every
element of Section 10(b) as to each defendant in order to reach a
61

In re Global Crossing, Ltd. Sec. Litig., 322 F. Supp. 2d 319, 328-29 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc., 482 F.3d
372 (5th Cir. 2007); In re Global Crossing, 322 F. Supp. 2d at 324-25.
63
Scienter, in the securities fraud context, refers to a state of mind “embracing intent to
deceive, manipulate, or defraud.” Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976). It has also
been interpreted to encompass extreme recklessness. Kurtis A. Kemper, Annotation, What
Constitutes Recklessness Sufficient to Show Necessary Element of Scienter in Civil Action for
Damages Under § 10(b) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C.A. § 78j(b)) and Rule 10b-5
of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 49 A.L.R. Fed. 392 (2009).
64
Allegations sounding in fraud must be pled with particularity. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
Because a securities fraud case that meets the heightened pleading standard will most likely settle
before trial, most cases focus on the plaintiff’s burden of stating a viable claim, rather than proving
the allegations.
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Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 773-74, 764
(2008) (“[T]he implied right of action in § 10(b) continues to cover secondary actors who commit
primary violations” but “the conduct of a secondary actor must . . . satisfy each of the elements or
preconditions for § 10(b) liability” to assert a primary violation.).
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secondary actor. Instead, plaintiffs followed the “path of least resistance”
by alleging that a primary actor, e.g., the corporation, made a material
misstatement or omission to the public regarding the corporation’s
financial health, and a secondary actor, e.g., the corporation’s
underwriter, aided and abetted the making of that misstatement or
omission.67 Thus, as to the secondary actor, plaintiffs did not have to
plead scienter, reliance, and causation. Rather, it was enough to satisfy
the applicable aiding-and-abetting standard, such as substantial
assistance with knowledge of the fraud.
This situation changed in 1994 when the Supreme Court handed
down its decision in Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate
Bank of Denver, N.A.68 The decision, which surprised many in the legal
community,69 held that the implied cause of action under Section 10(b)
did not reach aiders and abettors.70
In Central Bank, the plaintiff bought $2.1 million worth of bonds
issued by a Colorado Springs public authority.71 The bonds were secured
by landowner assessment liens on property owned by the authority and
tied to the property’s value. Defendant Central Bank acted as indenture
trustee for the bond issue.72 During the closing of the bond sale, Central
Bank learned that due to declines in land values in Colorado Springs, the
assessment lien valuation completed earlier that year may have no longer
reflected the current value of the land.73 Despite this knowledge, Central
Bank failed to order a new valuation, and the authority went ahead with
the bond sale.74 Within months of the closing, the authority defaulted on
the bonds.75 Plaintiff brought a Section 10(b) suit naming the authority as
a primary defendant and Central Bank as a secondary defendant.76
Plaintiff alleged that Central Bank aided and abetted the wrongful bond
sale by recklessly failing to order a new valuation of the lien, when it had
reason to believe that the old valuation was inadequate.77
The Supreme Court disagreed, affirming summary judgment for
Central Bank on the grounds that private civil liability under Section
10(b) did not extend to those who merely aided or abetted a practice
67

In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 376 F. Supp. 2d 472, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
511 U.S. 164 (1994).
69
See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, High Court Ruling Sharply Curbs Suits on Securities
Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1994, at D8 (reporting that “[t]he Supreme Court, sweeping aside years
of lower court precedents as well as a longstanding policy of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, . . . sharply limited lawsuits that charge accountants and other outside professionals
with taking part indirectly in a securities fraud”).
70
Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 191.
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Id. at 167-68.
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Id. at 167.
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Id. at 167-68.
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prohibited by the statute.78 The Court determined that “when Congress
enacts a statute under which a person may sue and recover damages from
a private defendant for the defendant’s violation of some statutory norm,
there is no general presumption that the plaintiff may also sue aiders and
abettors.”79 Instead, the text of the statute determined the scope of
liability, and the absence of any reference to aiding and abetting in
Section 10(b) was controlling.80 The Court contrasted Congress’s silence
regarding aiding and abetting in the Securities Exchange Act to its
express provision for such remedy in other contexts.81
Further, the Court stated that even if it were to look beyond the
statutory language, it would find that Congress in 1934 did not intend for
Section 10(b) to reach aiders and abettors.82 First, the Court reasoned that
since none of the Act’s express causes of action mentioned aiding-andabetting liability, Congress likely did not intend to provide for such
liability in Section 10(b)’s implied cause of action either.83 Second, the
Court rejected the plaintiff’s proposition that aiding-and-abetting liability
was implied in every statutorily created private right of action because
the doctrine “was ‘well established in both civil and criminal actions by
1934’” and Congress “legislated with an understanding of general
principles of tort law.”84 The Court disagreed with the plaintiffs’
reasoning, instead finding that the doctrine of civil aiding and abetting
was “at best uncertain in application” and not very well developed.85
Moreover, the fact that Congress never enacted a “general civil aiding
and abetting statute” also weighed against accepting the broad
presumption in favor of implying aiding-and-abetting liability in every
action.86
Finally, the Court found that there were policy considerations for
restricting the scope of Section 10(b) to primary violations.87 These
included the uncertainty of the standard regarding aiding-and-abetting
liability, the highly fact-sensitive nature of any inquiry into such liability,
and the resultant potential for excessive litigation.88 Although conceding
78

Id. at 191-92
Id. at 182.
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Id. at 173.
81
Id. at 176 (“Congress knew how to impose aiding and abetting liability when it chose
to do so.” (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2 and 7 U.S.C. § 192(g) as examples of statutes that expressly provided
for aiding and abetting)).
82
Id. at 178.
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Id. at 179.
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Id. at 181 (quoting Brief for the Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Respondents at 10, Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,
511 U.S. 164 (1994)).
85
Id. at 181-82 (noting that, until the proliferation of securities suits, aiding and abetting
was “‘largely confined to isolated acts of adolescents in rural society’” (quoting Halberstam v.
Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 489 (D.C. Cir. 1983))).
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Id. at 182.
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See id. at 188-90.
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that “competing policy arguments in favor of aiding-and-abetting
liability can also be advanced,” the Court found that these arguments
were not sufficient to override the text of the statute.89
C.

Testing the Limits of Primary Liability for Secondary Actors
After Central Bank

While expressly striking down aiding-and-abetting liability as a
cause of action under Section 10(b), the Supreme Court in Central Bank,
nevertheless stated that “[t]he absence of § 10(b) aiding-and-abetting
liability does not mean that secondary actors in the securities markets are
always free from liability under the securities Acts.”90 Secondary actors
could still be liable as primary violators in securities fraud, as long as the
plaintiff adequately pleaded all elements of a Section 10(b) claim as to
the secondary actor.91 Thus, although plaintiffs could no longer follow
the “path of least resistance” by invoking aiding and abetting, they could
still reach secondary actors by alleging that a secondary actor (1)
engaged in some type of deceptive conduct, which was part of the
primary actor’s overall scheme to defraud the investing public; (2) the
secondary actor acted with scienter; (3) the plaintiff bought shares in
reliance on the fraudulent information; and (4) the plaintiff suffered an
economic loss as a direct result of this reliance.92
Acknowledging the difficulty of proving individual reliance by
each plaintiff on a false public statement, the Supreme Court had in prior
opinions adopted two presumptions of reliance. First, under the duty-todisclose presumption, stemming from the Supreme Court’s decision in
Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States,93 where a defendant owes
a plaintiff a duty of full disclosure but omits material information,
plaintiff’s reliance on the wrongful omission is presumed.94 Second,
under the fraud-on-the-market presumption, first articulated in Basic Inc.
v. Levinson,95 a plaintiff is presumed to rely on information disseminated
in an efficient securities market.96
In the years following Central Bank, plaintiffs were able to
invoke one of these presumptions to satisfy the reliance requirement as to
89

Id. at 189-90.
Id. at 191.
91
Id.
92
See Simpson v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., 452 F.3d 1040, 1047 (9th Cir. 2006)
(discussing the elements of Section 10(b) liability), judgment vacated, 128 S. Ct. 1119 (2008),
opinion vacated, 519 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2008).
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406 U.S. 128 (1972).
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Id. at 152-53.
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485 U.S. 224 (1988).
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Id. at 241-47. This presumption is based on the premise that in mature securities
markets, like the public exchanges in the U.S., the price of a security “reflects all publicly available
information, and, hence, any material misrepresentations.” Id. at 246. “‘Misleading statements will
therefore defraud purchasers of stock even if the purchasers do not directly rely on the
misstatements.’” Id. at 241-42 (quoting Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160 (3d Cir. 1986)).
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both primary and secondary defendants. The reasoning was that
plaintiffs’ reliance on the primary actor’s false statements could be
imputed to the secondary actors because the secondary actors’ conduct
was part of the same fraudulent scheme that created the false statements
in the first place.97 Thus, to plead secondary actor liability, all plaintiffs
had to do was show that they had constructively relied on the primary
defendant’s misstatements, suffering an economic loss as a result, and
that the secondary defendant, through its misconduct, had helped bring
about the misstatements.98
D.

Further Tightening of the Standard Under Stoneridge

In 2008, the Supreme Court’s decision in Stoneridge Investment
Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.99 once again altered the
landscape of secondary actor liability in securities fraud litigation. This
time, the Court turned its attention to the issue of proving reliance and
causation with regard to secondary actors. In Stoneridge, the plaintiffs
alleged that Charter, a telecommunications company, engaged in a
variety of fraudulent accounting practices to artificially inflate its stock
price.100 One such practice, known as round-tripping, consisted of
improperly recording revenue from certain barter transactions with thirdparty suppliers.101 Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola provided Charter with
digital cable converter (set-top) boxes.102 Charter agreed to overpay the
suppliers $20 for each set-top box with the understanding that they
would pay Charter back by purchasing unnecessary advertising from it.103
This arrangement enabled Charter to inflate its revenue and operating
cash flow by approximately $17 million.104 To conceal the fraud from its
auditors, Charter convinced the suppliers to prepare forged
97

See Simpson, 452 F.3d at 1051 (“The requirement of reliance is satisfied [as to the
secondary actor] if the introduction of misleading statements into the securities market was the
intended end result of a scheme to misrepresent revenue.”) (dismissing plaintiffs’ claim against the
secondary defendant on other grounds); see also Joanna B. Apolinsky, Is There Any Viability to
Scheme Liability for Secondary Actors After Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. ScientificAtlanta,
Inc.?
(2008)
(unpublished
paper
at
12),
available
at
http://works.bepress.com/joanna_apolinsky/1 (“[A]lthough reliance [was] still a required element in
the plaintiff’s case, the proof requirement thereof [was] significantly relaxed in these contexts.”).
98
Of course, plaintiffs still had to show that the secondary defendant acted with scienter.
Since secondary actors were now only liable for primary violations, they had to have acted with the
same state of mind as the primary actors to be held accountable under Section 10(b). Pleading
scienter, therefore, became the biggest hurdle for plaintiffs in stating a claim against secondary
actors. The scienter requirement also served as a safeguard against meritless suits or overexpansion
of the universe of potential defendants. See, e.g., Simpson, 452 F.3d at 1049 (explaining that
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documentation for the transactions, including letters to Charter falsely
justifying the $20 increase in set-top box price by rising production
costs.105 The suppliers also backdated the advertisement agreements to
make it appear as though the barter transactions were independent of
each other.106
When the truth about Charter’s accounting fraud emerged and
Charter’s stock price plummeted, investors brought a Section 10(b) suit
against both Charter and the suppliers.107 The plaintiffs alleged that
Charter made false and misleading statements to the public through its
SEC filings, which contained the inflated earnings numbers.108 As for the
suppliers, the plaintiffs averred that they engaged in fraudulent
transactions with Charter, while knowingly or recklessly disregarding
“Charter’s intention to use the transactions to inflate its revenues and
[knowing] the resulting financial statements issued by Charter would be
relied upon by . . . investors.”109
The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint
against the suppliers for failure to state a claim, holding that Section
10(b) does not provide for a private cause of action against a party who
participated in another’s fraudulent scheme, but on whose conduct
investors did not rely.110 Citing its decision in Central Bank, the Court
reiterated the premise that only primary violations of Section 10(b) are
subject to private suits and a plaintiff seeking to recover against a
secondary actor in a securities fraud action must prove every element of
the primary violation, including reliance.111 According to the Court,
“[r]eliance by the plaintiff upon the defendant’s deceptive acts is an
essential element of the § 10(b) private cause of action” and a “predicate
for liability” because it provides the “‘requisite causal connection
between a defendant’s [acts] and a plaintiff’s injury.’”112 Since the
suppliers in this case neither made a public statement, nor violated a duty
to disclose to the Charter investors, the Court reasoned that plaintiffs
could not have relied on the suppliers’ actions in making their investment
decisions.113 In other words, the suppliers’ fraudulent conduct could not
be said to have caused the investors’ injury.
Significantly, the Court expressly rejected the proposition that a
secondary actor’s participation in the overall fraudulent scheme provided
the necessary causal link between the actor’s conduct and the investors’
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Id.

1554

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:4

injury.114 According to the plaintiffs, the suppliers’ intentional or reckless
participation in Charter’s fraudulent scheme warranted a presumption of
reliance because Charter’s public financial statements were “a natural
and expected consequence” of the suppliers’ deceptive conduct.115 The
Court read the plaintiffs’ argument as proposing a general rule that “in an
efficient market investors rely not only upon the public statements
relating to a security but also upon the transactions those statements
reflect.”116
The majority declined to adopt this rule and instead embarked on
an inquiry as to “whether [the suppliers’] acts were immediate or remote
to the injury.”117 The Court concluded that the suppliers’ acts of
deception were “too remote to satisfy the requirement of reliance”
because it was Charter who reported fraudulent earnings in its financial
statements, and “nothing [the suppliers] did made it necessary or
inevitable for Charter to record the transactions as it did.”118 This part of
the majority’s opinion led the dissent to criticize the Court for having in
effect adopted a new “super-causation” requirement for proving
reliance,119 and for failing, at the least, to remand the case to the lower
court to determine whether the plaintiffs alleged enough facts to plead
reliance.120 In the dissent’s view, the majority “ha[d] it backwards” when
it interpreted the Basic fraud-on-the-market presumption to control the
kind of conduct that can “cause” investor loss.121 According to the
dissent, the purpose of the Basic presumption was to help plaintiffs who
cannot show individual reliance on the fraudulent information.122 The
presumption did not dictate what kind of conduct by the defendant could
cause the plaintiff injury.123 Thus, following the dissent’s logic, it would
be enough for investors to prove reliance by (1) demonstrating that a
secondary defendant’s conduct had proximately caused false information
to reach the market, and (2) invoking the fraud-on-the-market
presumption to show that the false information was the basis for the
plaintiffs’ investment decision.
The majority also refused to expand the scope of liability under
Section 10(b) to reach any secondary actors who committed a deceptive
act in the process of facilitating the primary defendant’s fraudulent

114

Id. at 770.
Id. The Court summarized plaintiffs’ logic as follows: “[H]ad respondents not assisted
Charter, Charter’s auditor would not have been fooled, and the financial statement[s] would have
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scheme.124 While recognizing that the suppliers’ conduct may be culpable
under state common law fraud rules, the Court reiterated that Section
10(b) “does not reach all commercial transactions that are fraudulent and
affect the price of a security in some attenuated way.”125 Such an
expansion, in the Court’s opinion, would effectively revive aiding-andabetting liability under Section 10(b), something it decisively struck
down in Central Bank.126 In addition, the practical implication of such an
expansion would be to “rais[e] the costs of doing business” in the U.S.
because every market participant, whether it trades public securities or
not, could become subject to frivolous and extortionary law suits.127
Stoneridge, thus, completed the process of narrowing the scope
of secondary actor liability under Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act, begun by Central Bank. Until 1994, shareholders could
sue their issuers for fraudulently failing to disclose truthful information
about the issuer’s financial health, and could simultaneously assert
Section 10(b) claims against third parties that assisted, or aided and
abetted, the failure. After Central Bank, plaintiffs could no longer plead
aiding-and-abetting liability under Section 10(b), but they could still
successfully sue certain secondary actors for conduct that contributed to
the overall deception of the shareholders. Stoneridge further limited the
scope of secondary actor liability by requiring plaintiffs to show a direct
connection between the secondary actor’s wrongful conduct and the
deception, so that plaintiffs can be said to have relied on the secondary
actor’s conduct in making their investment decisions. The following Part
shows how the recent South African apartheid litigation foreshadows a
similar trend towards the narrowing of the secondary actor liability in the
context of ATCA claims.
IV.

KHULUMANI V. BARCLAY AND AIDING-AND-ABETTING LIABILITY
UNDER ATCA

In contrast to the securities context, the Supreme Court has not
addressed the issue of aiding-and-abetting liability under ATCA. To
date, most lower courts to consider the issue have assumed that ATCA
reaches aiders and abettors,128 much like how courts had assumed the
existence of aiding-and-abetting liability under Section 10(b) prior to
Central Bank. However, the recent dismissal by a district court of an
aiding-and-abetting claim in a complaint filed by victims of the South
124
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African apartheid129 suggested a new trend. Moreover, the Second
Circuit’s split decision in Khulumani v. Barclay National Bank Ltd.,
although reinstating the complaint, demonstrates that the days of aidingand-abetting liability under ATCA may be numbered.
A.

History and Overview of ATCA

ATCA provides in full that “[t]he district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States.”130 Adopted by the First Congress in 1789, the Act was rarely
invoked until the 1980s when it gained prominence as a means for
victims of international human rights abuses to claim redress in U.S.
courts.131 In Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,132 the first modern-era decision to
uphold an action under ATCA, the Second Circuit held that a district
court could exercise jurisdiction over a wrongful death claim brought by
a citizen of Paraguay against a Paraguayan police officer who tortured
and killed the plaintiff’s teenage son.133 After examining several sources
of international law, the court concluded that government-sponsored
torture constituted a violation of “the law of nations” within the meaning
of ATCA, thus setting the precedent for later suits brought under the
Act.134 Importantly, the court interpreted the term “law of nations” to
include not just international law norms that existed in 1789, but also
modern international law.135
Over the next two decades, however, courts struggled to resolve
“complex and controversial questions regarding the meaning and scope
of ATCA.”136 The Supreme Court addressed some of these issues in 2004
in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.137 In Sosa, the plaintiff was a Mexican
citizen who was abducted and forcibly brought to the U.S. to stand trial
in a criminal case.138 The abduction was carried out by a group of
Mexican operatives acting on orders of the U.S. Drug Enforcement
Administration.139 The plaintiff subsequently sued one of the Mexican
129

See In re South African Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 538, 549-50 (S.D.N.Y.
2004), aff’d in part, vacated in part and remanded by Khulumani v. Barclay Nat. Bank Ltd., 504
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operatives under ATCA, alleging arbitrary arrest and forced detention in
violation of international law.140 Although recognizing that ATCA
authorized district courts to hear tort claims arising from certain
violations of contemporary international law,141 the Supreme Court
nevertheless dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint finding that it fell
outside ATCA’s scope.142 In an effort to delineate the scope, the Court
held that “the law of nations” in the modern sense is comprised only of
international norms that are “accepted by the civilized world and defined
with a specificity” comparable to the acceptance and specificity that
defined “the historical paradigms familiar when [ATCA] was enacted.”143
Applying this stringent standard to the plaintiff’s claim, the Sosa Court
concluded that the claim was not actionable under ATCA because a onetime illegal detention for a single day did not violate any norm that rose
to the status of the law of nations.144
B.

Khulumani v. Barclay
1. Factual and Procedural Background

The Second Circuit’s decision in Khulumani v. Barclay National
Bank Ltd. arose from a series of actions consolidated at the district court
level as In re South African Apartheid Litigation.145 The actions were
filed by several groups of plaintiffs on behalf of millions of victims of
the apartheid regime, a system that existed in South Africa between 1948
and at least 1991, whereby the country’s white minority dominated,
oppressed, and exploited the majority black population.146 Under the
system, the South African government restricted blacks to certain areas
of the country, where they remained “in a state of near-enslavement.”147
To keep the black population in obedience, the government authorities
frequently cracked down on popular uprisings and used terror tactics,
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including summary executions and imprisonment, violence against
children, sexual abuse, and torture.148
The suits named as defendants approximately fifty U.S. and
foreign corporations.149 The plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that the
corporations, all of whom did business in South Africa during the
apartheid years, aided and abetted the regime’s atrocities by supplying
resources, such as oil, technology and capital, to the South African
government, which used the resources in part “to further its policies of
oppression and persecution of the African majority.”150
The District Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim finding that,
even assuming the South African government’s alleged conduct
constituted a violation of the law of nations within the meaning of
ATCA, aiding and abetting such conduct is not actionable under ATCA.
The Court reached this conclusion by determining that aiding and
abetting is not itself a violation of a sufficiently definite and universally
accepted norm of international customary law and thus did not fit Sosa’s
definition of the law of nations.151 In particular, the District Court refused
to recognize as customary international law the rulings by the
International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda
(ICTY and ICTR, respectively), and the Apartheid Convention, all of
which recognized aiding-and-abetting liability for crimes against
humanity.152 The District Court reasoned that, in contrast to the instant
apartheid suits, the ICTY and ICTR dealt with criminal rather than civil
matters.153 As for the Apartheid Convention, it was not a universally
accepted source of international law because it was not ratified by
several major world powers, including the United States.154
The District Court further declined to find that ATCA itself
recognized aiding-and-abetting liability, reasoning that under the
Supreme Court’s decision in Central Bank, a civil statute should not be
interpreted to authorize a cause of action against aiders and abettors
unless Congress expressly provided for such liability.155 The District
Court found the rule of Central Bank and the policies behind it
particularly relevant to the present case because ATCA, like Section
148
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10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, governs an area that is “ripe for
non-meritorious and blunderbuss suits.” Additionally, it is the “Court’s
duty to engage in ‘vigilant doorkeeping,’” by not allowing “innovative
interpretations” of ATCA.156 Having found that there is no private cause
of action for aiding and abetting under the ATCA, the District Court
dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims for lack of jurisdiction.157
2. The Second Circuit’s Split Decision
Plaintiffs in In re South African Apartheid Litigation appealed
the District Court’s dismissal of their complaints. On appeal, in
Khulumani v. Barclay National Bank Ltd.,158 the Second Circuit vacated
the dismissal to the extent it related to the plaintiffs’ aiding-and-abetting
claims.159 In a 2-to-1 decision, the majority—Judges Hall and
Katzmann—held that the District Court erred in concluding that ATCA
did not provide for federal jurisdiction over claims alleging aiding and
abetting violations of customary international law.160
Significantly, though, while agreeing that ATCA permitted
aiding and abetting claims, the majority disagreed over the standard for
stating such claims. Judge Hall concluded that the standard should be
found in domestic federal common law.161 Contrarily, Judge Katzmann
opined that the standard was governed by international customary law.162
The third member of the panel, U.S. District Court Judge Korman, sitting
by designation, dissented in the judgment, citing among many other
grounds for dismissing the case his position that ATCA did not provide
for aiding-and-abetting liability.163 However, he concurred in part with
Judge Katzmann’s opinion, finding that the latter’s choice of
international customary law represented “an emerging consensus” for
determining the standard for aiding-and-abetting liability, which the
plaintiffs in any case could not meet as a matter of law.164 These
disagreements among the Judges highlight the current lack of a clear
standard defining secondary actor liability under ATCA, and forecast the
uncertain future of such claims.

156

Id. at 550-51 (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 729 (2004)).
Id. at 543.
158
Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007) (per curiam),
aff’d, American Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 128 S. Ct. 2424 (2008).
159
Id. at 264.
160
Id. at 260.
161
Id. at 287-88 (Hall, J., concurring).
162
Id. at 268 (Katzmann, J., concurring).
163
Id. at 320-21 (Korman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
164
Id. at 293, 333.
157
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a. Judge Hall’s Opinion
While recognizing that customary international law governed
primary liability under ATCA,165 Judge Hall concluded that a federal
court should derive a standard for secondary liability from domestic
federal common law.166 Judge Hall reasoned that while international
customary law could be relied on to provide a set of substantive
principles, it was “unnecessary and implausible” to expect a consensus
among different legal systems with regard to specific causes of action
recognized by their respective courts.167 Therefore, it was up to the
federal common law to fill the “interstice” created by the lack of
conformity among international legal norms on various ancillary issues,
such as secondary liability.168
Having selected federal common law as the appropriate source
for defining civil aiding-and-abetting liability, Judge Hall ruled that
section 876 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which defines thirdparty liability, was the proper standard for aiding-and-abetting liability in
the context of ATCA.169 Under Judge Hall’s standard, then, a person aids
and abets a violation of customary international law when that person
provides another with substantial assistance with actual or constructive
knowledge that the other will use the assistance to commit a violation of
customary international law.170 In conclusion, Judge Hall suggested that
the plaintiffs’ allegations, although not particularly specific, were
sufficient to state a claim under this standard.171
b. Judge Katzmann’s Opinion
In contrast to Judge Hall, Judge Katzmann held in his opinion
that courts must look at international law in determining whether a
plaintiff can state a claim for aiding and abetting a violation of the law of
nations.172 Judge Katzmann determined that the scope of liability under
ATCA was intertwined with the scope of the courts’ jurisdictional power
under the Act.173 According to Judge Katzmann, the limited scope of the
jurisdictional power is best guarded against overextensions by “requiring
that the specific conduct allegedly committed by the defendants sued
165

For example, genocide is defined in the 1951 Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (the Genocide Convention), and crimes against humanity are
described by the Charter of the International Military Tribunal (the Nuremberg Tribunal). Id. at 28586 & n.2, 3 (Hall, J., concurring).
166
Id. at 284-86.
167
Id. at 286.
168
Id. at 287.
169
Id. at 288.
170
Id. at 288-89.
171
Id. at 291.
172
Id. at 268 (Katzmann, J., concurring).
173
Id. at 269.
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represents a violation of international law.”174 In support of this
argument, Judge Katzmann relied on dictum from Sosa, which referred
to the hypothetical question of “whether international law extends the
scope of liability” for a violation of the law of nations to private (as
opposed to state) actors.175 Judge Katzmann reasoned that the question of
whether liability for a violation of a particular norm reaches aiders and
abettors is analogous to the Sosa Court’s hypothetical, and is therefore
similarly governed by international law.176
Judge Katzmann also carefully distinguished between the roles
of federal common law and international law in recognizing specific
causes of action under ATCA.177 While federal common law controls the
question of what remedies are available for violations of international
norms, the law of nations defines the scope of a particular violation and
determines whether a federal court has the power to hear the suit in the
first place.178
Having determined that the question of aiding-and-abetting
liability is governed by international common law, Judge Katzmann held
that aiding and abetting is actionable under ATCA because States
universally recognize, on a legal and moral level, “the individual
responsibility of a defendant who aids and abets a violation of
international law.”179 After reviewing the history of international criminal
law norms, Judge Katzmannn discerned a core definition of aiding-andabetting liability that is sufficiently well-defined and widely accepted to
command “the same level of consensus as the 18th-century crimes
identified . . . in Sosa,” and thus should be recognized as the modern law
of nations.180 Under this definition, a defendant aids and abets a violation
of a norm of international common law, when the defendant “(1)
provides practical assistance to the principal which has a substantial
effect on the perpetration of the crime, and (2) does so with the purpose
of facilitating the commission of that crime.”181

174

Id.
Id.
176
Id.
177
Id.
178
Id. at 269-70.
179
Id. at 270.
180
Id. at 276-77 & n.12. Judge Katzmann pointed out that individual responsibility of
persons who aid and abet the perpetration of such crimes as genocide, slavery, torture and apartheid,
has been recognized by numerous international treaties, and other international legal norms, in the
second half of the twentieth century. Id. at 273-74. For example, aiding-and-abetting liability was
expressly recognized by the statutes establishing the ICTY and the ICTR, which imposed liability on
any person “who planned, instigated, ordered, committed, or otherwise aided and abetted the
planning, preparation or execution” of a crime within the Tribunals’ jurisdictions. Id. at 274 (citing
Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, art. 7, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993); Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 6, S.C.
Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
181
Id. at 277 & n.12.
175
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Judge Katzmann argued that this formulation of aiding-andabetting liability finds reflection in a long tradition of international
criminal norms.182 For example, the London Charter, which established
the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg to address Nazi war
crimes and which has been recognized by federal courts and legal
scholars as an authoritative source of international law,183 extended
liability for certain war crimes to “accomplices participating in the
formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy.”184 More
recently, liability for aiding and abetting violations of international law
was codified in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
(“Rome Statute”), which provides, inter alia, that a defendant is guilty of
a crime if the defendant, “[f]or the purpose of facilitating the commission
of such a crime, aids, abets or otherwise assists in its commission.”185
Judge Katzmann further rejected Judge Hall’s contention that
reliance on international criminal law norms is not justified when
formulating a standard for aiding and abetting in a civil case.186 Judge
Katzmann explained that, first, “international law does not maintain the
kind of hermetic seal between criminal and civil law that the district
court sought to impose” and, second, prior case law “has consistently
relied on criminal law norms in establishing the content of customary
international law for purposes of ATCA.”187
c. Judge Korman’s Opinion
In contrast to the majority, Judge Korman rejected the
proposition that the scope of ATCA necessarily extended to aiding-andabetting liability.188 He would therefore affirm the District Court’s
dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claims against the secondary defendants.189
Nevertheless, similar to Judge Katzmann, Judge Korman opined that,
should ATCA be read to allow aiding-and-abetting liability, the standard
for pleading such liability must be defined by norms of international
common law.190 However, unlike Judge Katzmann, Judge Korman
concluded that it is not enough to simply show that international
182

Id. at 271.
Id.
184
Id. at 272 (quoting Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War
Criminals of the European Axis art. 6, Aug. 8, 1945, E.A.S. 472) (internal quotation marks omitted).
185
Id. at 275 (quoting Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 25(3)(c), July
17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90). The Rome Statute also makes a defendant liable for contributing to the
commission of a crime “by a group of persons acting with a common purpose.” Id. (quoting Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra, at art. 25(3)(d), 2187 U.N.T.S. 90). This type of
liability, unlike aiding and abetting, does not require intent to facilitate the commission of the crime;
knowledge of the intent of the group is enough. Id.
186
Id. at 270 n.5.
187
Id.
188
Id. at 320-21 (Korman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
189
Id. at 337.
190
Id. at 331.
183
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common law recognizes aiding-and-abetting liability in general. Instead,
a plaintiff states a claim for aiding and abetting an international crime
under ATCA only by invoking a norm of international law that
establishes such liability for the particular underlying crime.191 In support
of his proposition, Judge Korman relied on the language in Sosa, which
“require[s] a norm-by-norm analysis to determine whether ‘international
law extends the scope of liability for a violation of a given norm’” by a
secondary actor.192
Thus, while Judge Korman agreed with Judge Katzmann that the
Rome Statute’s definition of aiding and abetting certain crimes against
humanity represented “an emerging consensus”193 regarding the standard
for pleading aiding-and-abetting liability, no such definition existed at
the time of the apartheid, and therefore plaintiffs could not state a claim
against the defendants.194 In reaching his conclusion that the recognition
of aiding-and-abetting liability in the context of genocide postdated the
collapse of the apartheid government, Judge Korman provided his own
interpretation of the development of post-World War II international law,
different from those of the other two panel members. Thus, Judge
Korman cited a judgment rendered by the Nuremberg Tribunal, which
acquitted a banker accused of having authorized loans to German
businesses, in spite of the banker’s knowledge that those businesses
employed slave labor.195 Further, Judge Korman questioned Judge Hall’s
conclusion that historical sources from the First Congress era indicated
that “liability for aiding and abetting international law violations was
contemplated under ATCA” by its drafters.196
191

Id.
Id. (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 n.20 (2004)).
193
Id. at 293. In particular, Judge Korman noted that the Statute has been signed by the
vast majority of democracies and is consistent with the U.S. domestic law. Id. at 333. Interestingly,
the U.S. is one of few industrialized countries that have not signed the Rome Statute, but neither
Judge Korman nor Judge Katzmann appeared to take issue with this. See id. at 276 n.9 (Katzmann,
J., concurring) (contending that the United States’ refusal to sign the Statute is “unrelated to any
concern over the definition of aiding-and-abetting”).
194
Id. at 333 (Korman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Failure of the law of
nations at the time of the apartheid to recognize liability for aiding and abetting the kinds of human
rights abuses alleged by plaintiffs was only one of the grounds on which Judge Korman would
affirm the District Court’s dismissal of the complaint. The other two grounds were public policy
reasons which, according to Judge Korman, should compel the District Court to defer to the
positions of the United State and South African governments and decline to exercise jurisdiction, id.
at 295-311, and failure of international law, as it existed at the time of the apartheid, to recognize
corporate liability for violations of human rights, id. at 311, 321-26.
195
Id. at 292 (citing United States v. von Weizsaecker, 14 Trials of War Criminals Before
the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10 308, 622 (William S. Hein &
Co., 1997) (1949)) (holding that knowingly providing financing for an enterprise that used slave
labor is not a violation of international law).
196
Id. at 328-29 (finding a 1795 opinion by Attorney General William Bradford, which
suggested that British subjects could seek redress in a U.S. court under ATCA against Americans
who “voluntarily joined, conducted, aided, and abetted a French fleet in attacking [a British]
settlement,” ambiguous as to whether the defendants would be subject to primary or secondary
liability) (quoting 1 Op. Att’y. Gen. 57 (1795)).
192
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Finally, Judge Korman rejected the contention that aiding-andabetting liability under ATCA can be presumed from the general
availability and understanding of this cause of action in the late 18th
century.197 He opined that such a contention is inconsistent with the
Supreme Court’s decision in Central Bank, which held that courts must
not automatically infer aiding-and-abetting liability from a statutorily
created cause of action that did not expressly provide for such liability.198
According to Judge Korman, the fact that “the same Congress that
enacted ATCA, without reference to [aiding-and-abetting] liability,
explicitly made it a crime to aid-and-abet acts of piracy”199 demonstrated
Congress’s intent not to create aiding-and-abetting liability under
ATCA.200 Therefore, Judge Korman concluded that the complaint should
be dismissed because liability for the civil wrongs alleged by the
plaintiffs was neither contemplated by the framers of ATCA, nor
grounded in an international law norm that was in existence during the
apartheid regime.201
The Second Circuit’s split decision in Khulumani, therefore,
demonstrates the complexity of the issues underlying the problem of
holding secondary actors accountable for human rights abuses under
ATCA. The decision failed to elucidate a single standard for pleading
aiding-and-abetting liability under the Act.202 Moreover, Judge Korman’s
dissent suggested a new trend towards a narrower construction of
ATCA’s scope and away from allowing plaintiffs to recover from parties
that did not themselves commit human rights abuses, but merely aided
and abetted their commission. As discussed in the following Part, this
trend echoes the evolution of secondary actor liability under Section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act.
V.

COMPARING SECONDARY ACTOR LIABILITY UNDER ATCA AND
SECTION 10(B)

As demonstrated in Parts III and IV of this Note, suits filed
under ATCA and Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act often
concern the common problem of extending liability beyond primary
197

Id. at 326.
Id. at 326-27 (citing Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S.
164, 182 (1994)); see also supra Part III.B for a detailed discussion of Central Bank.
199
Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 327. Judge Hall’s opinion cited this prohibition against aiding
and abetting piracy—a quintessential violation of the law of nations—as evidence that Congress
intended aiders and abettors to be liable under ATCA. Id. at 288 & n.5 (Hall, J., concurring).
200
Id. at 327 (Korman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he First
Congress ‘knew how to impose aiding and abetting liability when it chose to do so . . . .’”) (quoting
Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 174 (1994)).
201
Id. at 326.
202
See In re South African Apartheid Litig., Nos. 02 MDL 1499, 02 Civ. 4712, 02 Civ.
6218, 03 Civ. 1024, 03 Civ. 4524, 2009 WL 960078, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 2009) (stating that
“the division of opinion between the [Judges] left [district courts] without a standard to apply or
even a decision concerning the source of law from which . . . [to] derive a standard”).
198
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wrongdoers to third parties whose conduct was instrumental in the
perpetration of the wrong. In both cases, the resolution of the problem
must turn on the interpretation of the scope of liability under the
respective federal Act. Therefore, comparing the two Acts and analyzing
the reasons for the Supreme Court’s restrictive interpretation of Section
10(b)’s scope may shed light on the future of secondary actor liability
under ATCA. This part will show that, although, given the history of
Section 10(b) jurisprudence, the Supreme Court is likely to adopt a
similarly narrow approach to defining the scope of ATCA, this will not
entirely preclude plaintiffs from holding culpable secondary actors
accountable for violations of international law.
A.

In the Future, the Supreme Court Is Likely to Eliminate Aidingand-Abetting Liability Under ATCA

After the Second Circuit in Khulumani upheld the possibility of
an aiding-and-abetting claim under ATCA and reversed the district
court’s dismissal of the complaint, the defendants sought reversal by the
Supreme Court. In May 2008, the Supreme Court denied the Khulumani
defendants’ certiorari petition because the Court failed to reach a
quorum.203 As a result, the issue of aiding-and-abetting liability under
ATCA remains unresolved by the nation’s highest court.204 However,
should the opportunity present itself again in the future, the Supreme

203

Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 128 S. Ct. 2424 (2008); see also Tony Mauro,
Supreme Court Recusals Hit Home in Controversial Apartheid Suit, LEGAL TIMES, May 13, 2008,
available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202421335045.
204
The motions to dismiss by the various defendants have since been adjudicated by the
district court on remand. On April 8, 2009, the district court granted in part and denied in part the
motions. In re South African Apartheid Litig., Nos. 02 MDL 1499, 02 Civ. 4712, 02 Civ. 6218, 03
Civ. 1024, 03 Civ. 4524, 2009 WL 960078, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 2009). Adopting a commonsense approach, district court Judge Shira Scheindlin looked at the “quality of the assistance
provided to the primary violator.” Id. at *12. According to Judge Scheindlin, merely “doing
business” with a perpetrator or funding its activities does not rise to the level of aiding and abetting.
Id. However, providing goods “specifically designed” to enable the perpetrator to carry out its
crimes may constitute aiding and abetting. Id. Applying these guidelines, Judge Scheindlin, first,
dismissed aiding-and-abetting claims against Barclays and UBS, which allegedly provided loans to
the South African government and bought army bonds, thus financing the apartheid regime. Id. at
*20. Second, Judge Scheindlin upheld claims against defendants Daimler, Ford, and GM, alleging
that the auto-makers sold specialized military vehicles to the South African army and police forces,
which were then used for suppressing uprisings, id. at *16, and allowed its personnel to carry out the
arrests and interrogations of dissidents on behalf of the South African government, id. at *15. The
judge, however, dismissed, with leave to amend, those claims that merely alleged that the automakers sold passenger cars and ordinary commercial trucks to the government, without evidence of
“military customization or similar features that link [the vehicles] to an illegal use.” Id. at *18.
Finally, the judge upheld claims against defendants IBM and Fujitsu alleging that the technology
companies developed and sold to the South African government special software and hardware for
processing and monitoring the country’s black population, id. at *16, *19, but dismissed those
claims that merely asserted that the technology companies sold ordinary computers to government
agencies, including the Department of Prisons, while knowing that the prisons practiced illegal
detentions and torture, id. at *19.
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Court is likely to rule that ATCA does not allow aiding-and-abetting
liability.205
1. The Central Bank Analytical Framework
In considering whether to adopt an interpretation of ATCA that
allows for aiding-and-abetting liability, the Supreme Court will be bound
by the analytical framework of statutory interpretation it set forth in
Central Bank. The application of Central Bank’s reasoning has not been
limited to securities litigation and will be equally applicable in the
context of an ATCA claim.206 The applicability of the Central Bank
statutory interpretation analysis to ATCA is not changed by the fact that
Central Bank interpreted the availability of an implied private right of
action in a statute,207 whereas ATCA is jurisdictional in nature and does
not create a cause of action, express or implied.208 The difference
between a jurisdictional statute and one that creates a cause of action is
that the latter gives a party substantive grounds for recovery in court,
whereas the former merely allows a court to use its discretion in deciding
whether to hear a case brought before it.209 This says nothing, however,
about how courts should construe the statute in exercising their
discretionary powers. Because federal courts derive their jurisdiction
from Congress in the first place, “Congress, and not the courts . . .
possesses the power to define the scope of the court’s jurisdiction.”210
Therefore, there is no analytical difference between interpreting the
scope of a congressionally-created cause of action and the scope of a

205

In doing so, the Supreme Court will go against lower courts’ precedent. But the
Supreme Court did exactly that in Central Bank. See Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate
Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 192 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for
eliminating aiding and abetting under Section 10(b), even though “[i]n hundreds of judicial and
administrative proceedings in every Circuit in the federal system, the courts and the SEC have
concluded that aiders and abettors are subject to liability under § 10(b)”); Linda Greenhouse, High
Court Ruling Sharply Curbs Suits on Securities Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1994, at D8 (reporting
that the Supreme Court in Central Bank “swe[pt] aside years of lower court precedents as well as a
longstanding policy of the Securities and Exchange Commission”).
206
See Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 193 (2005) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (finding that “[t]he . . . reasons [set forth in Central Bank] militate equally against
extending the implied cause of action [for gender discrimination] under Title IX to retaliation
claims); see also Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief and Dev., 549 F.3d 685, 688 (7th Cir. 2008)
(applying Central Bank’s reasoning to determine the scope of a counterterrorism statute because
“nothing in [the Court’s] holding turns on particular features of [securities] laws”).
207
Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164,
171 (1994).
208
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 713 (2004).
209
Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction and Merits, 80 WASH. L. REV. 643, 676 (2005)
(“Jurisdictional grants empower courts to hear and resolve cases brought before them by parties;
substantive causes of action grant parties permission to bring those cases before the court.”).
210
Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 266 (2d Cir. 2007) (Katzmann,
J., concurring), aff’d, American Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 128 S. Ct. 2424 (2008).
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jurisdictional statute.211 Moreover, courts have previously rejected
attempts to distinguish Central Bank on the basis of the particular cause
of action it involved.212 Consequently, Central Bank will control the
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the scope of ATCA.
In deciding whether ATCA’s scope includes aiding-and-abetting
liability, the Court will follow a three-step approach employed in Central
Bank for analyzing the scope of liability under Section 10(b). In Central
Bank, the Court first examined the language of the statute to decide
whether Section 10(b) could be said to prohibit aiding and abetting.213
Second, the Court considered whether such prohibition could be implied
from the congressional intent at the time of Section 10(b)’s enactment.214
Finally, the Court weighed policy reasons for and against expanding
Section 10(b)’s liability to reach aiders and abettors.215
2. Statutory Language
Consistent with the Central Bank framework, in deciding
whether ATCA reaches aiders and abettors, the Supreme Court will be
compelled to first look at ATCA’s language. Statutory language is
controlling with respect to determining the scope of liability under an act
of Congress.216 In Central Bank, the Supreme Court found the absence of
any reference to aiding and abetting in the text of Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act to be dispositive of the issue of whether the
Section reached aiders and abettors.217
In the years since Central Bank, courts have followed the same
rationale in refusing to expand the scope of liability under other federal
statutes. For example, in Freeman v. DirecTV, Inc.,218 the Ninth Circuit
held that liability under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
(ECPA) did not extend to aiders and abettors.219 ECPA prohibits any
“person or entity providing an electronic communication service to the
public [from] knowingly divulg[ing] to any person or entity the contents
211

See id. at 266 n.2 (suggesting that “because federal courts have only the jurisdiction
granted to them by Congress, their exercise of common-law discretion is better viewed as creating a
cause of action than jurisdiction”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
212
See Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief and Dev., 549 F.3d 685, 689 (7th Cir. 2008)
(noting that Central Bank’s reasoning is not limited to statutes that create an implied private right of
action, because the holding in the case applied to suits by non-private parties as well).
213
Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164,
173 (1994).
214
Id. at 178, 180-81.
215
Id. at 188.
216
Id. at 173. Statutory language is “[t]he starting point in every case involving
construction of a statute.” Id. (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197) (alteration in
original).
217
Id. at 175 (noting that “the language of Section 10(b) does not in terms mention aiding
and abetting” (quoting Brief for Security and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae at 8, 511
U.S. 164 (1994) (No. 92-854)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
218
457 F.3d 1001 (9th Cir. 2006).
219
Id. at 1002.
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of a communication while in electronic storage by that service.”220 The
statute further authorizes a private cause of action against anyone who
intentionally or knowingly “engage[s]” in the prohibited conduct.221
The plaintiffs in Freeman were internet users who participated in
online message boards dedicated to pirating satellite television signals.222
The content of the message boards became subject to a separate,
unrelated dispute involving DirecTV, a provider of satellite television.223
The Freeman plaintiffs alleged that DirecTV violated ECPA by aiding
and abetting the internet provider in the unauthorized disclosure of the
message board communications to third parties.224 In rejecting the
plaintiffs’ theory of liability, the court stated that it was bound by a
statute’s plain language unless it would lead to an unreasonable result.225
The court reasoned that since the text of ECPA made no reference to
aiding-and-abetting liability, such liability was beyond the statute’s
scope.226 The plaintiffs argued that aiding-and-abetting liability was
available within a reasonable construction of ECPA’s plain language,
because the statute expressly authorized suits against those who
“engage[]” in the prohibited conduct.227 The court disagreed, finding that,
viewed in the textual context of the statute as a whole, the word
“engage[]” could not be read so broadly as to include aiding and
abetting.228
Similarly, in Boim v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief and
Development,229 the Seventh Circuit held that a federal statute that
provides a private cause of action to any U.S. national who was
“injured . . . by reason of an act of international terrorism”230 did not
authorize suits against aiders and abettors of terrorism.231 In Boim,
parents of an American teenager killed in Israel by Hamas militants sued
several U.S. Muslim non-profit organizations alleging that the non-profit
organizations assisted international terrorism by providing financial
220

18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1) (2006).
Id. § 2707(a).
222
Freeman, 457 F.3d at 1003.
223
Id. at 1002-03.
224
Id. at 1003. Plaintiffs could not sue DirecTV as a primary violator of the ECPA
because the TV company was not a provider of the internet service that stored the message board
communications. Id. at 1004. Thus, the court was limited to deciding whether DirecTV could be held
liable as a secondary actor. Id.
225
Id. at 1004-05 (“The starting point of [a statute’s] interpretation . . . is always its
language.”).
226
Id. at 1005.
227
Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 2707(a) (2006).
228
Freeman, 457. F.3d at 1005.
229
549 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2008).
230
18 U.S.C. § 2333(a). Section 2333(a) was originally enacted as part of the AntiTerrorism Act of 1990, and reenacted two years later as part of the Federal Courts Administration
Act of 1992, under the title “Terrorism Civil Remedy.” See Seth N. Stratton, Note, Taking Terrorists
to Court: A Practical Evaluation of Civil Suits Against Terrorists Under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 9
SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 27, 30 n.19 (2004).
231
Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief and Dev., 549 F.3d 685, 688-90 (7th Cir. 2008).
221
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support to Hamas.232 In rejecting that part of the plaintiff’s rationale, the
court reasoned that, under Central Bank, the statute’s failure to mention
aiding and abetting or other types of secondary liability meant such
liability does not exist.233 Since ATCA, like ECPA and the
counterterrorism provision in Boim, does not mention aiding and
abetting, the Supreme Court will have to conclude that the Act’s express
language does not authorize aiding-and-abetting liability.234
3. Congressional Intent to Create an Implied Right of Action
Having reached that conclusion, however, the Supreme Court
will proceed to the second step of the Central Bank analysis to determine
whether, given Congress’s intent, a private right of action against aiders
and abettors should be implied under ATCA.235 On the one hand, a
legislature’s failure to provide expressly for aiding-and-abetting liability
under a statute is evidence that the legislature did not intend to
incorporate such liability into the statute.236 This is especially true when
the legislature expressly authorizes aiding-and-abetting liability in other
contexts.237 On the other hand, evidence that Congress was generally
232

Id. at 688. Hamas, also known as Islamic Resistance Movement, is a Palestinian
religious and political group that is designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the U.S.
Government. See Garry W. Jenkins, Soft Power, Strategic Security, and International Philanthropy,
85 N.C. L. REV. 773, 817 n.186 (2007); Council on Foreign Relations, Backgrounder: Hamas,
http://www.cfr.org/publication/8968 (last visited on Apr. 15, 2009); U.S. Dep’t of State, Office of
the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Fact Sheet: Foreign Terrorist Organizations (Apr. 8, 2008),
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/08/103392.htm.
233
Boim, 549 F.3d at 689 (“[S]tatutory silence on the subject of secondary liability means
there is none . . . .”). Boim was an en banc rehearing of a prior panel decision, Boim v. Quranic
Literacy Institute, which had concluded that liability under Section 2333(a) did extend to aiders and
abettors. Id. at 688; see Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst. (Boim I), 291 F.3d 1000, 1021 (7th Cir.
2002). The panel in the original Boim I suit acknowledged the significance of the Central Bank
rationale in interpreting the scope of liability under a federal statute. Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1017-19.
However, the panel distinguished Central Bank, finding that extending liability under Section
2333(a) to aiders and abettors was justified given the legislative intent and the policies behind the
counterterrorism laws. Id. at 1019.
234
See Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 326 (2d Cir. 2007)
(Korman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing as erroneous and contrary to
precedent, an “assumption that, even though ATCA does not by its terms encompass aiding-andabetting liability, it should be construed as if it contains such language”), aff’d, American Isuzu
Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 128 S. Ct. 2424 (2008).
235
Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164,
178 (1994); see also Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1103 (1991) (“[T]he central
inquiry remains whether Congress intended to create, either expressly or by implication, a private
cause of action.”) (citing Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575-76 (1979)).
236
Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 177 (“If . . . Congress intended to impose aiding
and abetting liability, we presume it would have used the words ‘aid’ and ‘abet’ in the statutory text.
But it did not.”); see also Freeman v. DirecTV, Inc., 457 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th Cir. 2006) (“There is
no explicit provision in §§ 2702 and 2707 or anywhere else in the ECPA, providing for secondary
liability. Accordingly, it is reasonable to conclude that Congress knew what it was doing by not
including such claims.”).
237
Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 184 (Congress’s special provision for liability of
“controlling person[s]” under Section 20 of the Securities Exchange Act shows that “[w]hen
Congress wished to create such [secondary] liability, it had little trouble doing so.”) (citing Pinter v.
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aware of aiding-and-abetting liability and that the doctrine was wellestablished at the time of the statute’s enactment, does not, in and of
itself, warrant a presumption that Congress intended to implicitly
incorporate aiding-and-abetting liability into every federal law.238
Further, courts both before and after Central Bank, have warned
against interpreting legislative intent in a way that creates new causes of
action.239 In Central Bank, the Court expressed a concern over reading
aiding-and-abetting liability into Section 10(b)’s prohibition against
fraudulent statements.240 The Court’s reason for the concern was that
doing so would expose to liability those who do not, whether directly or
indirectly, engage in conduct prohibited by the statute.241 This, according
to the Court, would allow a plaintiff to successfully sue a defendant
under Section 10(b) without satisfying all elements of liability critical to
recovery, e.g. reliance.242 The Court refused to impute to the legislature
an intention to create such an “anomalous” result.243
Four of the Supreme Court’s nine Justices subscribed to the same
rationale in interpreting the scope of liability under another federal
statute in Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education.244 In Jackson, a
school coach of a girls’ basketball team sued his school under Title IX of
the Education Amendments of 1972, which prohibit in-school
discrimination on the basis sex.245 The coach alleged that he was a victim
of sex discrimination because, after he had complained to his supervisors
about disparate treatment of the girls’ team, the school retaliated against
him by removing him from his coach position.246 While the majority in
Jackson upheld the plaintiff’s claim, the dissenting Justices argued
against expanding liability under Title IX to encompass retaliation. The
dissent analogized the case with Central Bank and reasoned that similar
to aiding and abetting claims under Section 10(b), claims based merely
on retaliation would lack elements required for prevailing on a claim of
discrimination, because retaliation can take place without
Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 650 (1988)) (alterations in original). “Congress knew how to impose aiding and
abetting liability when it chose to do so.” Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 176.
238
Id. at 180-81. The Supreme Court also questioned the extent to which civil aiding-andabetting liability was an established doctrine in the 1930s, or even is today, noting that “Congress
has not enacted a general civil aiding and abetting statute” and that the doctrine’s application in
common law is infrequent and uncertain. Id. at 181-82.
239
See, e.g., Va. Bankshares, Inc., 501 U.S. at 1102 (“[T]he breadth of the right once
recognized should not, as a general matter, grow beyond the scope congressionally intended.”);
Freeman, 457 F.3d at 1006 (“When a statute is precise about who . . . can be liable courts should not
implicitly read secondary liability into the statute.”) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
240
Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 176.
241
Id. (“[A]iding and abetting liability reaches persons who do not engage in the
proscribed activities at all, but who give a degree of aid to those who do.”).
242
Id. at 180.
243
Id.
244
544 U.S. 167 (2005).
245
Id. at 171.
246
Id. at 171-72.
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discrimination.247 Such interpretation of the statute, in the dissent’s
opinion, would ignore Congress’s intent because it would effectively
read a completely new cause of action into the statute.248
For the same reason, the Supreme Court will likely decline to
read aiding and abetting into ATCA by implication. ATCA makes no
mention of aiding-and-abetting liability or similar types of secondary
liability. Yet just a year after enacting ATCA, Congress passed a law
prohibiting piracy and other similar acts of hostility against the United
States, and expressly made liable those who “knowingly and wittingly
aid and assist, procure, command, counsel or advise” the commission of
such acts.249 Thus, the Supreme Court, consistent with its reasoning in
Central Bank, will likely conclude that the 1st Congress “knew how to
impose aiding-and-abetting liability when it chose to do so,”250 and that
Congress’s failure to provide for aiding-and-abetting liability in ATCA
shows lack of intent to do so.251 Moreover, the Supreme Court is unlikely
to agree with Judge Hall’s characterization in Khulumani that “the
Founding Generation . . . understood that ATCA encompassed aiding
and abetting.”252 Regardless of the particular merits of Judge Hall’s
characterization, the doctrine of aiding-and-abetting liability was
undoubtedly less developed in the 1780s than in the 1930s.253
Accordingly, the Supreme Court will probably refuse to impute to the 1st
Congress a broadly defined intent to attach aiding-and-abetting liability
to all of its legislative acts, just like it refused to impute such intent to the
73d Congress in Central Bank.
Further, the Supreme Court will likely be reluctant to read
Congress’s intent in a way that would expand the scope of ATCA’s
247

Id. at 194 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. (“[B]y recognizing [the plaintiff’s] claim, the majority creates an entirely new
cause of action . . . .”); cf. Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief and Dev., 549 F.3d 685, 689-90 (7th
Cir. 2008) (arguing, along the same lines, that implying secondary liability in section 2333(a) of the
Terrorism Civil Remedy statute would impermissibly expand the statute’s scope by “enlarg[ing] the
federal courts’ extraterritorial jurisdiction”).
249
Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 9, §§ 9, 10, 1 Stat. 112, 114 (1790).
250
Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164,
176 (1994).
251
See also Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 326-27 (2d Cir. 2007)
(Korman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he same Congress that enacted the
ATCA, without reference to aiding-and-abetting liability, explicitly made it a crime to aid-and-abet
acts of piracy, a violation of the law of nations.”), aff’d, American Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza,
128 S. Ct. 2424 (2008).
252
Id. at 288 n.5 (Hall, J., concurring). In support of this proposition, Judge Hall cited,
inter alia, a 1795 opinion by Attorney General Bradford, which appears to state that liability under
ATCA could attach to U.S. citizens who “voluntarily joined, conducted, aided, and abetted a French
fleet in attacking” a British settlement in West Africa. Id.; 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 57, 57-59 (1795). Judge
Korman, however, rebutted Judge Hall’s reading of the opinion, finding it ambiguous as to whether
the Attorney General referred to primary or secondary liability. Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 329
(Korman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
253
The doctrine of aiding-and-abetting liability originates in criminal law. Eid, supra note
28, at 1180; see also Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 181. But Congress did not codify criminal
aiding and abetting until 1902, long after the passage of ATCA. See 60 Cong. Ch. 321, 35 Stat. 1088
(1909).
248
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liability to reach aiders and abettors because doing so could create “an
entirely new cause of action”254 lacking elements required under ATCA.
Currently, ATCA, as explained in Sosa, only permits claims for a
violation of an international norm that is “accepted by the civilized world
and defined with a specificity comparable to” the acceptance and
specificity enjoyed by “the historical paradigms” of the late 17th
century.255 Given the uncertainty surrounding the doctrine of aiding-andabetting liability, and the standard by which it should be defined,256
expanding the scope of ATCA could expose to liability those who, while
aiding and abetting an international crime, do not themselves violate a
universally accepted and sufficiently well-defined norm of international
law. The Supreme Court is unlikely to accept a statutory interpretation
that could lead to such a result.
4. Public Policy Considerations
Finally, having reached the last step of its analytical framework,
the Supreme Court is equally likely to reject aiding-and-abetting liability
under ATCA on public policy grounds. Although not an independent
basis for statutory interpretation, public policy considerations may be
used to buttress the Court’s decision not to expand the scope of ATCA.257
Policy review is especially appropriate where, as in ATCA’s case, there
is scant direct evidence of congressional intent.258
Similar sets of conflicting policy considerations permeate the
subject of secondary actor liability in the securities fraud and ATCA
litigation contexts. Before Central Bank, the main arguments in favor of
attaching secondary liability to aiders and abettors were deterrence and
fairness.259 After Central Bank, plaintiffs have similarly argued that
holding culpable secondary actors liable under Section 10(b) is necessary

254

Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 195 (2005) (Thomas, J.,

dissenting).

255

Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725, 732 (2004); see also supra note 116 and
accompanying text.
256
Cf. Judge Katzmann’s and Judge Hall’s divergent definitions for aiding and abetting in
Khulumani, supra Part IV.B.2.
257
Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 188 (“Policy considerations cannot override our
interpretation of the text and structure of the Act, except to the extent they may help to show that
adherence to the text and structure would lead to a result ‘so bizarre’ that Congress could not have
intended it.”).
258
See Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1104-05 (1991) (stating that
where a right of action was originally inferred from a statute in the absence of “conclusive guidance”
from the legislature, courts may “look[] to policy reasons for deciding where the outer limits of the
right should lie”).
259
See Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 188 (paraphrasing an amicus party’s argument
that “the aiding and abetting cause of action deters secondary actors from contributing to fraudulent
activities and ensures that defrauded plaintiffs are made whole”).
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as a deterrent against fraud on the securities markets,260 and is consistent
with the notion that no act of deliberate fraud should go unpunished.261
At the same time, many arguments have been advanced against
exposing secondary actors to liability under Section 10(b). Thus, in
Central Bank, the Supreme Court noted the uncertainty surrounding the
standard for determining aiding-and-abetting liability as a factor against
extending Section 10(b)’s reach.262 First, the court reasoned that this
uncertainty in the rules would tend to protract litigation and increase the
cost of defense. As a result, many secondary actors, including those with
valid defenses, would be forced to settle rather than litigate. This, in turn,
would result in the proliferation of strike suits, and other meritless
litigation. Finally, in the Court’s opinion, excessive and extortionate
litigation would send ripples throughout the securities markets, raising
the cost of doing business in the United States.263 These costs would
ultimately be passed on to investors, whom the Securities Exchange Act
is supposed to protect.264
In Stoneridge, the Supreme Court also used public policy
analysis to further narrow the scope of Section 10(b) liability to exclude
“scheme liability.”265 In particular, the Court emphasized the existence of
alternative remedies that can both serve as a deterrent to fraud and
provide recovery to injured investors. Thus, the court pointed out that
secondary actors who engage in fraud remain subject to criminal laws,266
state anti-fraud statutes,267 and civil actions brought by the SEC.268
Critics of ATCA have set forth remarkably similar arguments in
favor of restricting its scope to exclude aiding-and-abetting liability. In
In re South African Apartheid Litigation, Judge Sprizzo characterized
ATCA litigation as “an area that is . . . ripe for non-meritorious and
blunderbuss suits.”269 Critics also often underscore the vexatious nature
260

See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 778 n.10
(2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he availability of private rights of action . . . provide[s] a means
for defrauded investors to recover damages and a powerful deterrent against violations of the
securities laws.”).
261
Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 782 (“Congress enacted § 10(b) with the understanding that
. . . every wrong would have a remedy.”); Apolinsky, supra note 97, at 2 (suggesting as one rationale
for holding secondary actors accountable under Section 10(b) “to punish as many wrongdoers as
possible who participated in the scheme”).
262
Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 188.
263
Id. at 189.
264
Id.
265
Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 770, 772-73.
266
Id. at 773 (“[C]riminal penalties are a strong deterrent.”).
267
Id. (noting that “some state securities laws permit state authorities to seek fines and
restitution from aiders and abettors”).
268
Id. (stating that since 2002, the SEC recovered approximately $10 billion for the
benefit of investors harmed by fraud). The SEC is authorized to sue aiders and abettors of securities
fraud under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA). See 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2006).
269
In re South African Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 538, 550 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), aff’d
in part and denied in part, Khulmani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007), aff’d,
American Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 128 S. Ct. 2424 (2008).
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of ATCA litigation by pointing to the extraordinarily large amounts
demanded by the plaintiffs.270
In Khulumani, Judge Korman cited other public policy grounds
for restricting the scope of liability under ATCA to primary violations.
He noted that allowing suits against companies that do business with
oppressive regimes would have a “chilling effect” on foreign direct
investment in those countries.271 Additionally, Judge Korman pointed to
the efforts of the modern South African government to provide
restitution and other forms of relief to victims of the apartheid as more
appropriate domestic alternatives to suits in the U.S.272 Critics have also
advanced other alternatives to suits under ATCA, such as government
sanctions273 and the creation of an internationally enforceable code of
corporate conduct.274 Given the similarity between these concerns and
those expressed over securities fraud suits, the Supreme Court is likely to
weigh public policy considerations against expanding the scope of
ATCA.
Thus, when the Supreme Court has the opportunity again to
review the scope of ATCA, it will likely rule that the Act does not permit
aiding-and-abetting liability, just like the Court eliminated aiding-andabetting liability under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act in
Central Bank. Applying Central Bank’s analytical framework, the Court
will likely find that ATCA’s silence on the matter, Congress’s failure to
provide for aiding-and-abetting liability under the Act in spite of its
familiarity with the doctrine, and strong policy considerations, all weigh
against expanding the scope of ATCA to reach aiders and abettors.
B.

Elimination of Aiding-and-Abetting Liability Under ATCA Will
Not Mean the End of Corporate Accountability for Human
Rights Abuses

The issue of aiding-and-abetting liability under ATCA is of great
concern for plaintiffs’ lawyers and human rights advocates, and the
Supreme Court’s potential rejection of this theory of liability is likely to

270

For example, the plaintiffs in In re South African Apartheid Litigation demanded over
$40 billion in damages. In re South African Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d at 546.
271
Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 297 (2d Cir. 2007) (Korman, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part), aff’d, American Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 128 S. Ct.
2424 (2008). But see Herz, supra note 131, at 209-10 (arguing that the availability of aiding-andabetting liability actually encourages investment by promoting corporate responsibility and
“constructive engagement”).
272
Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 297, 301.
273
See Ivan Poullaos, The Nature of the Beast: Using the Alien Torts Claims Act to
Combat International Human Rights Violations, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 327, 354 (2002) (addressing the
shortcomings of this alternative).
274
Pia Zara Thadhani, Regulating Corporate Human Rights Abuses: Is Unocal the
Answer?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 619, 622 (2000).
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be viewed as a setback for victims of human rights abuses.275 An
interpretation of ATCA that eliminates aiding-and-abetting liability will
close off the “path of least resistance” for asserting claims of human
rights violations against corporations.276 However, upon a closer look, it
becomes clear that the concerns may be exaggerated. In light of the
resilience of claims against secondary actors in the securities fraud
context after Central Bank and Stoneridge, and the availability of several
alternative remedies, the loss of aiding-and-abetting liability in the
ATCA plaintiffs’ litigation playbook is similarly unlikely to have a
substantial negative impact on the ability of victims of human rights
abuses to recover from corporate wrongdoers.
First, the proliferation of the Section 10(b) litigation in the years
following Central Bank,277 including many successful claims against
secondary actors,278 suggests that ATCA plaintiffs will also continue to
bring successful claims against secondary actors under the primary
liability theory. When the Supreme Court handed down its decision in
Central Bank, it was initially viewed as a victory for the business
community.279 However, it soon became clear that Central Bank did not
present a serious bar to meritorious claims against culpable secondary
actors. Grasping onto the Court’s assurance that a secondary actor “may
be liable as a primary violator under 10b-5, assuming all of the
requirements for primary liability . . . are met,” plaintiffs’ lawyers were
able to shift the focus from asserting aiding and abetting to pleading
primary violations by secondary actors.280

275

See Anthony J. Sebok, More on the Second Circuit’s Recent, Significant Decision
Regarding Two Suits Involving the Alien Tort Claims Act: Part Two in a Two-Part Series, FINDLAW,
Nov. 6, 2007, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/sebok/20071106.html (“[A]iding and abetting under the
ATCA has become a very important topic, since it is the primary theory of liability that allows
human rights lawyers to sue corporations.”).
276
Cf. In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 376 F. Supp. 2d 472, 497-98 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (stating
that, prior to Central Bank, aiding-and-abetting liability provided a “path of least resistance” for
plaintiffs seeking to hold liable multiple corporate actors engaged in a common deceptive scheme).
277
For example, plaintiffs filed 111 suits in 1996, 173 in 1997, and 242 in 1998,
eventually leveling at approximately 192 suits per year. Cornerstone Research, Litigation Activity
Indices, http://securities.cornerstone.com/Research/litigation.htm (last visited January 29, 2009).
278
See supra Part III.C.
279
Thom Weidlich, Professionals Still at Risk: Plaintiffs’ Bar Shifts Gears to Revise
Claims in Central Bank’s Wake, NAT’L L.J., July 18, 1994, at A4.
280
Id. (reporting that most complaints had either already alleged primary liability against
secondary actors in addition to aiding and abetting, or can be easily amended to do so after Central
Bank because “[t]he conduct is no different from the conduct [the plaintiffs] were attacking before”).
Amending often did not present much of a challenge, since many of the stronger claims against
secondary actors were based on facts that were sufficient to plead the elements of primary liability.
Id. (“That the plaintiffs now must prove direct fraud does not necessarily mean they need to prove
different facts; the two theories are often alleged on the same facts.”); see id. (“Your case is going to
fly or not depending on what kind of direct involvement the [secondary actor] had in getting
securities sold. It’s always going to come down to what did the [secondary actor] know, when did
[she] know it and what did [she] do with the knowledge.”) (quoting a plaintiff’s lawyer) (internal
quotation marks omitted) ; see also supra notes 90-98 and accompanying text (discussing the use of
“scheme liability” to test the limits of primary liability).
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Even the Supreme Court’s more restrictive decision in
Stoneridge did not entirely foreclose secondary actor liability from the
securities fraud context.281 For example, the decision left the door open to
claims against secondary actors whose conduct is not “too remote to
satisfy the reliance requirement.”282 In addition, claims against secondary
actors whose conduct was not “in the ordinary course” of a business
relationship with the primary defendant, but rather directly affected the
market for securities, will also likely be sustained under Stoneridge.283
Similarly, in the event the Supreme Court refuses to recognize
aiding-and-abetting liability under ATCA, plaintiffs will still be able to
bring meritorious claims against secondary actors by alleging primary
violations of international law. Just as in the securities fraud context the
focus of the claims shifted to proving scienter and reliance, the focus of
ATCA claims against corporations complicit in human rights abuses will
shift to proving intent and causation.284 Claims that involve a corporation
merely “doing business in countries with repressive regimes”285 may have
to fall by the wayside, just like Section 10(b) claims grounded in the
“ordinary course” of the defendant’s business. But stronger claims with a
closer link between the company’s actions and the human rights abuse,
will probably survive.
Judge Scheindlin’s recent on-remand decision in In Re South
African Apartheid Litigation286 illustrates the often illusory line between
primary and secondary liability. Although ruling from the tentativelyupheld position that ATCA allows aiding-and-abetting liability, Judge
Scheindlin nevertheless focused her analysis of the individual claims on
the closeness of the “causal connection” between the secondary
defendant’s conduct and the underlying crime, on the one hand,287 and on
the secondary defendant’s state of mind, on the other hand288—both
factors that determine a defendant’s primary liability for the wrong.
281

Robert Schwinger & Eric Twiste, Stoneridge: Not the End of the Road, Securities Law
360, Jan. 18, 2008 (“[I]t still remains to be seen whether the ever-creative securities fraud bar will be
able to find ways to recharacterize their cases against secondary actors so as to be able to keep them
viable even under the strictures laid down in Stoneridge.”).
282
Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 770 (2008).
283
Id. at 774 (stating that the plaintiffs did not meet the Section 10(b) reliance
requirement because the secondary actors “were acting in concert with Charter in the ordinary course
as suppliers” and their round-tripping arrangements “took place in the marketplace for goods and
services, not in the investment sphere”).
284
To paraphrase the lawyer interviewed in the National Law Journal article, each “case
is going to fly or not depending on what kind of direct involvement the [complicit corporation] had
in [committing the particular human rights violation]. It’s always going to come down to what did
the [corporation] know, when did [the corporation] know it and what did [the corporation] do with
the knowledge.” Weidlich, supra note 279 (internal quotation marks omitted).
285
Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 289 (2d Cir. 2007) (Hall, J.,
concurring), aff’d, American Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 128 S. Ct. 2424 (2008).
286
Nos. 02 MDL 1499, 02 Civ. 4712, 02 Civ. 6218, 03 Civ. 1024, 03 Civ. 4524, 2009
WL 960078 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 2009).
287
Id. at *12.
288
Id. at *13-*15.
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Thus, Judge Scheindlin upheld aiding-and-abetting genocide claims
against car manufacturers that supplied the South African military with
custom-made armed vehicles and authorized its own security personnel
to carry out arrests and interrogations on behalf of the police289—conduct
that would probably also rise to the level of a primary offense. At the
same time, Judge Scheindlin dismissed several claims predicated on the
corporate defendants’ less culpable acts, such as providing loans to the
South African government290 or selling computers to government
agencies,291 thus dispelling the misguided fear that ATCA potentially
exposes to liability anyone who “does business” with a rogue State.
The second reason why human rights advocates should not fear
the Supreme Court’s likely abandonment of aiding-and-abetting liability
under ATCA is the availability of several viable alternative theories for
recovery from corporate defendants. In the Section 10(b) context, actions
by the SEC, which are not subject to the Central Bank and Stoneridge
restrictions, have recovered billions of dollars for the benefit of
defrauded investors.292 In the ATCA context, as an alternative to aiding
and abetting, victims can recover from corporations on the theories of
conspiracy, joint criminal enterprise, instigation, and procurement.293
Finally, abandoning aiding-and-abetting liability will eliminate
redundancies in the structure of ATCA claims. As in the securities fraud
context, the same conduct can often be characterized either as aiding and
abetting or as a direct violation. For example, in Boim v. Holy Land
Foundation for Relief & Development, Judge Posner declined to
recognize aiding-and-abetting liability under the federal Terrorism Civil
Remedy statute, but instead imposed liability on the defendants through a
“chain of incorporations by reference” of several statutory definitions.294
He found that although the statute did not prohibit aiding and abetting an
act of international terrorism, providing financial assistance to a foreign
terrorist organization may sometimes itself constitute “international
terrorism” under the statute’s definition of the term.295
Similarly, Judge Korman’s opinion in Khulumani proposes a
standard for aiding and abetting that makes the doctrine obsolete in the
context of ATCA claims. According to Judge Korman, to plead aiding
289

Id. at *15-*16; see also note 204.
In re South African Apartheid Litig., 2009 WL 960078, at *20; see also note 204.
291
In re South African Apartheid Litig., 2009 WL 960078, at *19; see also note 204.
292
Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 773 (2008);
see supra note 267 and accompanying text.
293
See Herz, supra note 131, at 216-17 (“Aiding and abetting is not the only form of
liability that is or should be available to hold accountable corporations intimately involved in gross
violations of universally recognized human rights.”); Maassarani, supra note 17, at 39 (noting that
“aiding and abetting liability is threatened by a number of doctrinal and political challenges that
counsel for a ready alternative”).
294
Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief and Dev., 549 F.3d 685, 690 (7th Cir. 2008); see
supra notes 229-234 and accompanying text.
295
Boim, 549 F.3d at 690.
290
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and abetting, a plaintiff has to show that the defendant violated a
universal international norm that extends aiding-and-abetting liability to
the particular underlying international law offense giving rise to the
suit.296 Under this standard then, one who aids and abets a violation of an
international legal norm will also necessarily violate a universal
international law himself, and thus become liable as a primary actor
under ATCA. Eliminating such redundancies in the structure of the
claims may actually benefit the cause of human rights advocacy by
removing confusion from the courts, streamlining litigation, and shifting
the focus to the issues of culpability and causation.
Thus, although a decision by the Supreme Court that limits the
scope of ATCA to exclude aiding-and-abetting liability will eliminate
one possible theory of recovery, it will not deprive deserving plaintiffs of
relief. Instead, it will bring the courts’ adjudication of ATCA claims in
line with the related and more mature securities fraud jurisprudence. By
doing so, it will screen out the weakest claims against corporate actors
whose participation in human rights abuses is only attenuated, without at
the same time denying plaintiffs the opportunity to assert stronger claims
against secondary actors for primary violations, or to pursue alternative
routes of redress.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Holding secondary actors (in particular, corporations)
accountable for their indirect participation in serious misconduct,
remains a continuing concern for victims of securities fraud and human
rights abuses alike. In a globalized world market, corporate players have
the capacity to inflict serious harm on vast numbers of people without
necessarily assuming the role of the primary perpetrator. Yet the doctrine
of secondary liability is underdeveloped, poorly defined, and excessively
politicized.297 In the context of securities litigation, since 1994, the
Supreme Court has taken a course towards restricting the doctrine’s
application in Section 10(b) suits, first eliminating the lynchpin of
secondary actor liability—aiding-and-abetting—in Central Bank, and
then further narrowing the scope of this type of liability in Stoneridge.298
The doctrine, however, has been remarkably resilient to the Court’s
narrowing, and secondary actors continue to be held liable under Section
10(b).299 Consistent with its own precedent, the Supreme Court will likely
similarly restrict secondary liability under ATCA in the near future, as
foreshadowed by the Second Circuit’s divided opinion in Khulumani.
Yet the resilience of secondary actor suits under Section 10(b) suggests
296
297
298
299

Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 327, 331; see supra notes 190-192 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.
See supra Parts III.B and III.D.
See supra Part III.C; supra notes 277-283 and accompanying text.
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that secondary actor liability will likewise survive in the context of
ATCA claims. Although it may have to shed the somewhat antiquated
theory of aiding and abetting along the way, secondary actor liability
under ATCA will continue to provide relief for victims of human rights
abuse around the world.
Andrei Takhteyev†

†

J.D., Brooklyn Law School (expected 2010); B.A., Middlebury College. The author would
like to thank Professors Beth Stephens and Yane Svetiev, as well as his colleagues at Brooklyn Law
Review, for their helpful feedback on the Note.

